I. INTRODUCTION
Wall Street has achieved a remarkable political comeback from the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] . Public anger over bailouts of large financial institutions spurred Congress to pass the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank) in July 2010. 1 Megabanks, however, used their political influence to weaken Dodd-Frank's provisions, 2 and they have pursued a determined campaign since 2010 to undermine DoddFrank's implementation. 3 A primary goal of Dodd-Frank is to end "too big to fail" (TBTF) treatment for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and their creditors. 4 During the debates over Dodd-Frank, however, Wall Street defeated two major initiatives that would have threatened megabanks' TBTF status. First, Wall Street's political allies voted down a proposed amendment by Senators Sherrod Brown and Ted Kaufman, which would have forced a For discussions of high-risk activities by large financial firms that precipitated the financial crisis, as well as the federal government's bailouts of financial giants and the public anger that followed, see generally ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE breakup of the six largest U.S. banks. 5 Second, Wall Street's allies blocked proposals that would have required the largest financial institutions to pay risk-based premiums to prefund the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF). 6 As discussed below, the OLF provides funding for resolving failed SIFIs under Title II of Dodd-Frank. 7 Due to Wall Street's success in defeating the prefunding proposals, the OLF currently has a zero balance and must rely on borrowings from the Treasury Department (Treasury) and, ultimately, taxpayers. 8 Large financial conglomerates (frequently called "universal banks") are determined to defend their current business model, which relies on government protection of depositors and "shadow banking" creditors to ensure low-cost funding for their speculative capital markets activities. 9 In December 2014, Wall Street's congressional allies succeeded in repealing the Lincoln Amendment, which was enacted as Section 716 of Dodd-Frank. 10 The Lincoln Amendment would have forced megabanks to incur significant additional costs by transferring many of their derivatives from their federally-insured bank subsidiaries to nonbank affiliates. 11 Wall Street's determined campaign to repeal the Lincoln Amendment "provides compelling evidence that Wall Street's business model depends on the ability of large financial 5 See, e.g., Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1055 n.454 (discussing the defeat of the Brown-Kaufman amendment, which would have imposed maximum size limits on large financial institutions); Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1366. 6 See Arthur Wilmarth, Use Tiered Regulation to Preserve Small Banks, Keep Big Ones in Line, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 2015, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/use-tiered-regula tion-to-protect-small-banks-keep-big-ones-in-line-1073578-1.html (discussing how Wall Street and its allies successfully defeated proposals to prefund the OLF). 7 See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussing the OLF). 8 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 999, 1015-18. 9 See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.1 (describing how universal banks use governmentsubsidized funding to support their capital markets activities); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the determination of top executives of global megabanks to maintain the universal banking model); Zoltan Pozsar et al., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458, SHADOW BANKING 22-33, 46-64 (2010) , available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1645337 (describing how the "shadow banking" system provides "shadow bank deposits" to finance the activities of U.S. and foreign megabanks and how federal agencies protected shadow banking creditors during the financial crisis). 10 See Wilmarth, supra note 6. 11 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 329-32.
conglomerates to keep exploiting the cheap funding provided by their 'too big to fail' subsidies . . . ." 12 This Article focuses on a key strategy adopted by Wall Street to preserve the universal banking model and its TBTF privileges. The financial industry has promoted the "single point of entry" (SPOE) plan for resolving failures of SIFIs under Title II of DoddFrank. 13 That plan has attracted the support of U.S. and foreign regulators. 14 As shown below, Wall Street's SPOE plan would ensure future bailouts for SIFIs and their short-term creditors while imposing the costs of those bailouts on ordinary investors and taxpayers. 15 Title II of Dodd-Frank establishes the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) to resolve failures of SIFIs. 16 Under the OLA, the Treasury Secretary may appoint the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver for a failing financial company if the failure of that company would have "serious adverse effects on financial stability," and if "no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent" the company's collapse. 17 Title II requires the FDIC to liquidate a failed SIFI while imposing losses on its shareholders and creditors. 18 Title II's liquidation-only mandate threatens the TBTF subsidy for SIFIs, 19 and it therefore presents a 12 Rob Blackwell, Why Citi May Soon Regret Its Big Victory on Capitol Hill, AM. BANKER, Dec. 11, 2014, http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/why-citi-may-soon-regr et-its-big-victory-on-capitol-hill-1071636-1.html (quoting my description of Wall Street's motivation for repealing Section 716 of Dodd-Frank). 13 See Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chair, FDIC, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 10, 2012), available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/ news/speeches/archives/2012/spmay1012.html (describing SPOE as "the most promising resolution strategy" for dealing with the failure of a global SIFI direct challenge to the universal banking model. To meet that challenge, Wall Street embraced the SPOE resolution approach.
As explained in Part II of this Article, the FDIC's early rulemakings under Title II indicated that the FDIC would comply with OLA's liquidation-only mandate by breaking up failed SIFIs through structured asset sales. The financial industry, however, responded by advocating the SPOE plan, which would place only the parent holding company of a failed SIFI in receivership while maintaining its operating subsidiaries as going concerns. Shortterm creditors of the holding company and all creditors of the operating subsidiaries would be fully protected. The protected creditors would include uninsured depositors and shadow banking creditors with close connections to Wall Street.
The financial industry's SPOE plan relies on a two-part funding strategy to guarantee continued protection for Wall Street. First, the parent holding company of each SIFI would issue long-term "bail-in" bonds. The FDIC would convert bail-in bonds into equity when a SIFI fails, thereby imposing losses on bail-in bondholders as well as shareholders. SIFIs would market and sell bail-in bonds to non-systemic investors, including mutual funds and pension funds that invest the savings of ordinary individuals.
Second, if write-offs of bail-in bonds are not sufficient to recapitalize a failed SIFI and its operating subsidiaries, SPOE would use the OLF's authority to borrow from Treasury. OLF loans-which are ultimately backstopped by taxpayers-would support the failed SIFI's operating subsidiaries and provide full protection to short-term creditors of the parent holding company and all creditors of the operating subsidiaries. At the end of the OLA process, a new, cleaned-up SIFI would emerge that closely resembles the failed SIFI, except for the losses imposed on the failed SIFI's shareholders and bail-in bondholders. Thus, contrary to Title II's explicit mandate, SPOE would reorganize, rather than liquidate, failed SIFIs and would also guarantee bailouts for Wall Street creditors while imposing the costs of those bailouts on ordinary investors and taxpayers.
Supporters contend that SPOE could provide significant benefits by maintaining the operating subsidiaries of a failed SIFI as going concerns and by facilitating cross-border cooperation among domestic and foreign regulators when a global SIFI fails. It is highly doubtful, however, whether those assumed advantages would be realized in fact. Moreover, SPOE's alleged benefits do not justify giving blanket protection to Wall Street creditors at the expense of ordinary investors and taxpayers.
Although U.S. and foreign regulators have not yet formally adopted SPOE, it appears very likely that they will do so. Given that reality, Part III of this Article proposes two reforms to reduce the TBTF subsidy inherent in SPOE. First, SIFIs should pay riskadjusted premiums to prefund the OLF at a level of $300 billion or more. The prefunded OLF should be used to cover the costs of resolving a failed SIFI after the FDIC has written off investments by shareholders, holders of subordinated debt, and qualifying holders of bail-in bonds. 20 Prefunding the OLF would help to protect taxpayers from bearing the costs of resolving failed SIFIs. In addition, risk-adjusted OLF premiums would (1) force SIFIs to internalize at least some of the systemic risks they create and (2) encourage SIFIs to follow more prudent operating strategies and adopt less complex business structures.
As part of their OLF premiums, SIFIs should pay special fees on their uninsured deposits and shadow banking liabilities. Under SPOE, those deposits and liabilities would receive full protection and would enjoy a status similar to insured deposits. The required fees should be comparable to risk-based deposit insurance premiums and should encourage SIFIs to establish more stable, longer-term funding structures.
Second, SIFIs should pay at least half of their compensation to senior executives and other key employees in the form of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos), a type of bail-in debt. Insiders should be required to hold their CoCos, without any 20 To prevent SIFIs from misleading ordinary investors, this Article proposes that SIFIs should be barred from selling bail-in bonds to ordinary individuals, retail mutual funds, or pension funds unless those bonds are explicitly described and marketed as "subordinated debt" that is junior to all general creditor claims. More complex forms of bail-in bonds should be sold only to sophisticated, wealthy individuals and asset managers who do not control funds invested by ordinary individuals. Title II of Dodd-Frank establishes the OLA to provide an orderly process for resolving failed SIFIs. Congress intended that the OLA would provide a "viable alternative" to a "bailout . . . that would expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market discipline." 21 Title II's blueprint for resolving failed SIFIs is similar to the FDIC's resolution regime for failed depository institutions. 22 Title II requires that a financial company placed in an OLA receivership must be liquidated and any losses from the liquidation must be imposed on the company's shareholders and 21 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010). 22 The financial company's business operations and assets will be sold off or liquidated, the culpable management of the company will be discharged, shareholders will have their investments wiped out, and unsecured creditors and counterparties will bear losses. 25 Congress did not want a failed SIFI to emerge from an OLA proceeding as a "rehabilitated" SIFI. 26 Instead, Congress expected that a failed SIFI would be broken up into smaller companies or its assets would be sold so that the result of an OLA receivership would be a reduced level of systemic risk. 27 Title II's liquidationonly mandate is a key component of Dodd-Frank's declared purpose "to end 'too big to fail' " and "to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts." 28 The [financial] company that imposes the losses on its creditors and shareholders . . . while ensuring that taxpayers bear none of the costs." 29 Both rules stated that the FDIC could establish a bridge financial company (BFC) to "continue key operations, services, and transactions that will maximize the value of [a failed SIFI's] assets and avoid a disorderly collapse in the market place." 30 However, the rules also said that a BFC would be employed only as a temporary expedient until the FDIC could arrange an orderly sale of the SIFI's assets to third parties. 31 The following statements from the rulemakings indicated that the FDIC would use a BFC to accomplish, not circumvent, the liquidation-only mandate:
[T]he FDIC is given broad authority under the DoddFrank Act to operate or liquidate the business, sell the assets, and resolve the liabilities of a covered financial company immediately after its appointment as receiver or as soon as conditions make this appropriate. This authority will enable the FDIC to act immediately to sell assets of the covered financial company to another entity or, if that is not possible, to an FDIC-created bridge financial company while maintaining critical functions . . . .
. . . Once the new [BFC]'s operations have stabilized as the market recognizes that it has adequate funding and will continue key operations, the FDIC would move as expeditiously as possible to sell operations and assets back into the private sector. 32 Thus, the FDIC's early rulemakings were consistent with Title II's liquidation-only mandate. The rulemakings did specify that the FDIC could give preferential treatment to certain short-term creditors to preserve crucial operations of failed SIFIs.
In contrast, the FDIC stated that it would never provide such treatment to holders of debt securities with maturities of more than 360 days. 33 In response to the FDIC's early rulemakings, many critics argued that the FDIC should not favor the same types of short-term Wall Street creditors-including counterparties under derivatives and securities repurchase agreements-whose reckless behavior contributed to the financial crisis. 34 As discussed below in Parts II.C. 1 40 SPOE could also reduce cross-border complications because the primary supervisor of a failed SIFI would control the resolution process at the "holding company level" while avoiding "foreign insolvency proceedings" for subsidiaries located in other countries. 41 oss-the-great-divide-ch13.pdf (stating that Mr. Guynn, a partner and the head of the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell, helped SIFMA and TCH to develop their "recapitalization-within-resolution" plan for dealing with failed SIFIs). 36 Letter from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Exec. While endorsing the SPOE concept, the FDIC and the BoE indicated that the final outcome of a SPOE resolution would be a liquidation of the failed SIFI. The agencies stated that SPOE's "top-down resolution" would be followed by "significant restructuring" that could include "shrinking the [SIFI's] balance sheet, breaking the company up into smaller entities, and/or selling or closing certain operations." 42 In December 2013, the FDIC presented a detailed SPOE proposal in a public call for comments. 43 Consistent with Wall Street's plan, the FDIC's proposal would put a failed SIFI's parent holding company into an OLA receivership while transferring its operating subsidiaries to a newly-formed BFC. 44 The FDIC would wipe out the equity interests of the SIFI's shareholders and convert the claims of the SIFI's long-term bondholders into equity interests in the BFC. 45 The failed SIFI's operating subsidiaries (including banks, securities broker-dealers, and insurance companies) would continue to operate without interruption under the BFC's control, and the rights of creditors of those subsidiaries would not be impaired. 46 After completing an SPOE resolution, the FDIC would approve a "restructuring" plan to transfer the operating subsidiaries from the BFC to one or more successor companies. 47 The FDIC explained that "restructuring might result in the [BFC] being divided into several companies or parts of entities being sold to third parties," and "the [BFC] might become smaller and less complex." 48 The FDIC's repeated use of the word "might" rather than "will," when discussing asset transfers and sales, indicated a 11e2-b0c3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rjlxII58 (explaining that, under SPOE, "subsidiaries (domestic and foreign) would be kept open and operating, thereby limiting contagion effects and cross-border complications"). 42 52 2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter, supra note 49, at 26 (emphasis added). The trade groups did not cite any provision of Title II that explicitly requires treatment for creditors similar to a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The groups did, the groups acknowledged, Title II only requires that creditors receive "at least as much value in satisfaction of their claims as they would have received in a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code." 53 To bolster their argument for a reorganization strategy, the Wall Street groups asserted that dissolving a failed SIFI's parent holding company would be sufficient to satisfy the liquidation-only mandate. 54 They also contended that Title II does not require any restructuring of operating subsidiaries after they are transferred to a BFC. 55 Other Wall Street supporters maintained that Title II would allow a BFC and its operating subsidiaries to emerge intact as a "new financial holding company" following an SPOE resolution. 56 Thus, Wall Street's SPOE plan contemplates little or no restructuring at the holding company level or the subsidiary level after the FDIC has transferred operating subsidiaries from a failed SIFI's parent holding company to a BFC. Wall Street obviously prefers a reorganization strategy that would convert a failed SIFI into a new, cleaned-up SIFI with a minimum of structural however, assert that a "duty" to provide such treatment could be "implied" from Title II's overall purpose to "avoid or mitigate" the potential for "serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States." Id. at 26 n.97. 53 Id. at 26 (citing Dodd-Frank § § 210(a)(7)(B), (d)(2)(B)). 54 Id. at 25. 55 Id. at 25, 27; see also Guynn, supra note 35, at 291 ("[T]he duty to liquidate only applies to the financial company that is actually put into a Title II receivership. Under the SPOE strategy, only the parent would be put into such a receivership."). 56 Guynn, supra note 35, at 295 ("In the final step, the old bridge company becomes a new financial holding company, fully in the private sector."). The Bipartisan Policy Center, a think tank that is widely viewed as a supporter of Wall Street, see infra note 62 and accompanying text, has advocated the same outcome. JOHN F. BOVENZI ET The financial industry has also advocated the enactment of a new "Chapter 14" of the Bankruptcy Code, which would authorize federal bankruptcy courts to use an SPOE approach for reorganizing insolvent financial holding companies. As I have described elsewhere, the financial industry's "Chapter 14" proposal contemplates even greater benefits for he FDIC intends to adapt certain claims forms and practices applicable to a Chapter 11 proceeding under the Bankruptcy code."); see also id. at 76,619 (stating that the FDIC's SPOE resolution process would follow the "fresh start model" for accounting treatment that is "generally applied to companies emerging from bankruptcy under Chapter 11").
C. WALL STREET'S SPOE STRATEGY WOULD ENSURE FUTURE BAILOUTS FOR WALL STREET CREDITORS AND IMPOSE LOSSES ON ORDINARY INVESTORS AND TAXPAYERS

SPOE Would Protect Wall Street Creditors of Failed SIFIs.
As shown in the preceding section, Wall Street's SPOE plan would allow a failed SIFI to be reorganized rather than liquidated, and it would enable the SIFI's successor holding company and former operating subsidiaries to emerge intact as a new SIFI. 60 Wall Street's version of SPOE would also maintain the operating subsidiaries during the resolution process and protect their creditors from any losses. 61 In a May 2013 report, the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC)-a think tank that receives significant funding from the financial industry and generally supports policies favorable to Wall Street 62 -highlighted those outcomes as key virtues of SPOE. 63 Wall Street's SPOE strategy strongly resembles the expedited "Section 363" transactions that federal officials used to reorganize Chrysler and General Motors (GM) under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 64 In 
Meanwhile, the claims of disfavored creditors (including secured bondholders, terminated dealers, and customers with product liability claims) were left behind in the bankruptcy estate of "old" Chrysler. 65 As Mark Roe and David Skeel pointed out, the Chrysler reorganization was highly controversial, and "[t]he unevenness of the compensation to prior creditors raised considerable concerns in capital markets." 66 Like the Chrysler transaction, Wall Street's SPOE plan would disfavor long-term bondholders of a failed SIFI's parent holding company while providing full protection to short-term creditors of the holding company and all creditors of its operating subsidiaries. relies on a two-part funding plan that would protect Wall Street creditors at the expense of ordinary investors and taxpayers. The first major funding source would be long-term bail-in bonds issued by parent holding companies of SIFIs. When a SIFI fails, the bail-in debt would be converted into equity to capitalize the newly-formed BFC, to support the SIFI's operating subsidiaries, and to protect the creditors of those subsidiaries from any losses. 68 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) recently proposed that global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) should be required to issue long-term debt to provide "total loss-absorbing capacity" (TLAC) for their resolution if they fail. 69 The FSB's TLAC proposal would compel G-SIBs (the largest global SIFIs) to issue long-term, unsecured debt that could be either written off or converted into equity.
The proceeds from write-downs and conversions of bail-in debt would be used to protect depositors and other favored short-term creditors, including counterparties under derivatives and securities repurchase agreements. 70 A former creditors, all of the repo counterparties, and all of the securities lending counterparties get bailed out"). . 70 See Krimminger, supra note 68, at 20-25 (discussing the use of bail-in debt to satisfy the FSB's proposed TLAC requirement); see also 2014 FSB TLAC Proposal, supra note 69, FDIC General Counsel remarked that the FSB's "TLAC proposal was developed in the context of [the SPOE] strategy" and was "designed to maintain systemically important operations in subsidiaries" of failed G-SIBs. 71 The FSB's TLAC proposal would force global SIFIs to issue hundreds of billions of dollars of bail-in debt. 72 SIFIs would face significant challenges in finding buyers for that debt. Regulators agree that SIFIs should not sell bail-in bonds to other SIFIs because cross-holdings of bail-in debt among large financial institutions would increase the risks of contagion during a crisis. 73 SIFIs could potentially sell bail-in debt to hedge funds and private equity funds. Many of those funds, however, borrow large amounts from SIFIs. Consequently, regulators might not be able to impose bail-in debt losses on hedge funds or private equity funds during a crisis due to concerns about their ability to repay their loans to SIFIs. 74 at 6-8, 13-20 (explaining the TLAC proposal). The FSB issued its final international TLAC standard in November 2015, after the manuscript for this article had been completed. See Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Issues Final Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity Standard for Global Systemically Important Banks (Nov. 9, 2015), available at http://www.financialst abilityboard.org/2015/11/tlac-press-release/.
71 Krimminger, supra note 68, at 23; see also id. at 1 n.1, 23 (noting that the author, a former FDIC General Counsel, "participated in the original discussions leading to the suggestion of the SPOE approach"). 72 Regulators are therefore likely to encourage SIFIs to sell bail-in debt to non-systemic investors, including pension funds and mutual funds. 75 Major banks have already sold about $300 billion of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). 76 CoCos are bail-in bonds that automatically convert to equity upon the occurrence of one or more designated events (such as the issuer's insolvency). 77 Banks have successfully marketed CoCos to asset managers because of a "hunt for yield" in a global debt market characterized by "ultra-low interest rates." 78 Analysts have expressed growing concerns about the complexity of CoCos and other bail-in bonds as well as the difficulty of estimating losses that investors might suffer from bond writedowns or conversions into equity. 79 In 2014 the U.K.'s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) barred U.K. banks from selling CoCos directly to retail investors due to their "complex" and "highly 75 risky" features. 80 The FCA and other regulators, however, have allowed SIFIs to sell CoCos and other bail-in bonds to pension funds and mutual funds that serve retail investors (retail mutual funds), even though ordinary individuals would ultimately bear any losses on those bonds. 81 Selling bail-in debt to pension funds and retail mutual funds would simply shift some of the costs of resolving failed SIFIs from taxpayers to individual savers while protecting favored Wall Street creditors. 82 In his recent testimony before a House of Lords subcommittee, HSBC chairman Douglas Flint argued that society must bear the costs of resolving failed SIFIs, and he noted that bail-in debt provides a method for "distributing the burden of failure" from taxpayers to pensioners and retail investors. 83 Mr. Flint asserted, "At the end of the day, the burden of failure rests with society. Whether you take it out of society's future income through taxation or whether you take it out through their pensions or savings, society is bearing the cost." 84 Mr. Flint's remarkable statement exposes the assumption of megabank insiders that society-including taxpayers, pensioners, and retail investors-must pay for the costs of resolving failed OrdinaryJoe.pdf (explaining that the FCA's ban on sales of CoCos to ordinary retail investors would not prohibit sales of CoCos to pension funds and "regulated collective investment scheme[s]" in which ordinary individuals hold "beneficial interests"); see also Bershidsky, supra note 75 (contending that regulators are likely to place retail investors at risk by allowing asset managers to buy CoCos). 82 See Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 24 ("[S]hifting from bail-out to bail-in will . . . primarily transfer the burden of loss from one set of domestic players, the taxpayers, to another, the pensioners and savers."). 83 SIFIs. 85 He did not mention the possibility that SIFIs or their insiders might bear any responsibility for excessive risk-taking. Mr. Flint's assertion reflects the prevailing attitude on Wall Street and in the City of London before, during, and after the financial crisis: SIFIs and their insiders should retain their profits and bonuses from high-risk activities while governments and ordinary citizens must bear the losses. 86 As a matter of social equity, "pushing pensioners [and retail investors] under the bus" to save SIFIs and their Wall Street creditors is no more palatable than relying on taxpayers to finance bailouts. 87 Pensioners and retail investors do not have a superior ability, compared with taxpayers, to evaluate the risks of SIFIs or to bear the financial burden of bailing out SIFIs and their favored creditors. 88 Accordingly, regulators should prohibit SIFIs from selling bail-in bonds to ordinary individuals, retail mutual funds, and pension funds unless those bonds are explicitly marketed and sold as "subordinated debt" that is junior to the claims of all general creditors. SIFIs should be barred from selling bonds to such investors that are designated as "senior" to subordinated debt but contain high-risk, bail-in features.
SIFIs are already concocting such instruments for the purpose of selling bail-in debt with lower interest rates than subordinated debt. 89 Prohibiting SIFIs from selling bail-in bonds, except for subordinated debt, to ordinary investors would (1) greatly reduce the risk of misleading those investors about the risks of bail-in bonds and (2) require SIFIs to pay higher interest rates that would more fairly compensate ordinary investors for the extraordinary risks inherent in bail-in debt. SIFIs should sell more complex bailin bonds only to sophisticated, wealthy individuals and to institutional investors who do not manage funds for ordinary individuals. The foregoing restrictions might persuade SIFIs to issue greater amounts of common stock and non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock in order to satisfy the FSB's proposed TLAC requirement. 90 That would be a highly desirable outcome. Shareholders' equity provides the most stable and durable source of funding for financial institutions because shareholders cannot force a SIFI to redeem their investments and cannot declare a default if a SIFI is forced to suspend dividends to conserve its capital. 91 Wall Street's SPOE plan relies on the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF) as its second major funding source and ultimate backstop. If the assets and bail-in bonds of a failed SIFI's holding company are not sufficient to capitalize the BFC and to cover the losses of its operating subsidiaries, the FDIC would use the OLF to fill the gap. 92 Dodd-Frank does not establish a prefunding mechanism for the OLF, and the OLF therefore has a zero balance. 93 The FDIC, however, can obtain immediate funding from the OLF by a MHHSL (reporting that SIFIs "are looking for clever ways to lower the cost" of bail-in debt by creating new types of bonds that "would incur losses in the event of a bank default but pay out less in interest to creditors than dearer, existing subordinated bonds"). 90 See Glover, Comfort & Moshinsky, supra note 75 (describing the challenges faced by megabanks in finding enough investors to purchase the bail-in bonds the banks must sell to satisfy the FSB's proposed TLAC requirement). 91 See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 22, at 223-24 (describing common stock and non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock). For a comprehensive analysis demonstrating that regulators should require megabanks to operate with much lower levels of leverage and to fund their operations with much higher levels of equity capital, see borrowing from Treasury a total amount of up to 10% of a failed SIFI's assets during the first thirty days after the FDIC has been appointed as receiver, plus 90% of the "fair value" of the failed SIFI's assets that become available to repay the OLF loan after the first thirty days. 94 The FDIC's ability to borrow from Treasury provides "huge amounts of funding" to protect favored creditors of SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries. 95 The fair value standard gives the FDIC considerable leeway in determining how much it can borrow from Treasury because it does not require the FDIC to use current market prices in valuing a failed SIFI's assets. 96 Moreover, as David Skeel has pointed out, Treasury loans for OLA resolutions will have "generous" terms, including interest rates that "will almost certainly be less than the penalty rate of interest called for in traditional lender-of-last-resort lending." 97 The FDIC must ordinarily repay an OLF loan from Treasury within five years. 98 If the proceeds from resolving a failed SIFI are insufficient to repay the loan, the FDIC must impose retroactive assessments on large financial institutions to recover the difference. 99 Treasury may, however, extend the FDIC's repayment period indefinitely if such action is necessary "to avoid a serious adverse effect on the financial system of the United States." 100 During a future systemic crisis, it is likely that the FDIC would request, and Treasury would approve, a prolonged extension of the OLF repayment schedule, thereby postponing the FDIC's duty to impose assessments on surviving SIFIs. During such a crisis-as was certainly true in 2008-many SIFIs would not be strong enough to bear the additional burden of paying large assessments, as they would be exposed to many of the same risks that caused their peers to fail. Accordingly, OLF loans for SPOE resolutions would frequently be extended far beyond the standard five-year term and would represent lengthy, taxpayer-funded bridge loans for the benefit of protected SIFI creditors. 101 Thus, Wall Street's SPOE plan would provide "a stealth bailout" for favored creditors of failed SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries because bail-in bondholders (i.e., ordinary investors) and OLF loans (i.e., taxpayers) would bear the burden of protecting those creditors. 102 Many favored creditors of failed SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries would be institutional investors with close connections to Wall Street, including holders of uninsured deposits, commercial paper, securities repurchase agreements, and other shadow banking liabilities. 103 As Adam Levitin has observed, SPOE "ensures that Wall Street [creditors] will be rescued if a SIFI goes down." 104 When the FDIC released its SPOE proposal, FDIC Vice Chair Thomas Hoenig warned that OLF funding would give SIFIs a significant cost of funding advantage, especially during future financial disruptions:
In times of financial stress, the knowledge that operating units [of failed SIFIs] will be provided funding to meet liquidity demands could serve to encourage corporate treasurers and others to place their funds with SIFIs' operating subsidiaries over other financial firms for whom such assurances are unavailable. Therefore, this assumption and access to funding provides SIFIs a significant competitive advantage. 105 FDIC Board Member Jeremiah Norton similarly cautioned that SPOE could cause "the market equilibrium [to] 
D. SPOE'S CLAIMED BENEFITS ARE HIGHLY DOUBTFUL AND DO NOT JUSTIFY BLANKET PROTECTION FOR WALL STREET CREDITORS OF FAILED SIFIS
Advocates for SPOE assert that the strategy has two significant advantages. First, SPOE could avoid disruptions in financial markets by preserving a failed SIFI's operating subsidiaries as going concerns. 108 Second, SPOE could reduce cross-border conflicts between home country and host country regulators when a global SIFI fails. 109 SPOE would allow the home country supervisor to maintain control of the parent holding company's receivership, and the operating subsidiaries could be kept out of foreign insolvency proceedings. 110 SPOE's assumed benefits have caused many U.S. and foreign regulators to express support for the strategy. 111 It is very doubtful, however, whether SPOE's claimed advantages would actually be realized when a SIFI fails. As to the first alleged benefit, the commencement of an OLA receivership for a failed SIFI's parent holding company would likely have serious and potentially fatal spillover effects on its operating subsidiaries. Counterparties of subsidiaries might well decide to cut off credit lines and cancel other contracts instead of waiting to see whether the subsidiaries could survive as going concerns. 112 For example, after Drexel Burnham Lambert's holding company declared bankruptcy in 1990, Drexel's two broker-dealer subsidiaries could not obtain even short-term credit from banks or other lenders, and the Securities and Exchange Commission was forced to place both broker-dealers in receivership. 113 SPOE's ability to maintain a failed SIFI's subsidiaries as going concerns is therefore open to serious question, especially during a systemic financial crisis.
There is also great uncertainty about SPOE's ability to promote cross-border coordination when a global SIFI fails. Despite intensive efforts by the G20 and the FSB, developed countries have not agreed on an international framework for resolving global SIFIs. SPOE can work only with the cooperation of each host country in which a failed SIFI has a significant presence. For example, each host country must allow the home country supervisor to control the resolution of the SIFI's parent holding 111 See supra notes 38-46, 69-71 and accompanying text (quoting statements of support for SPOE by FDIC and BoE officials and noting the FSB's evident agreement with the concept); Guynn, supra note 35, at 284-86 (citing expressions of support for SPOE by U.S. and foreign regulators); 2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter, supra note 49, at 7-11 ("The FDIC's SPOE Strategy under Title II of Dodd-Frank has been widely praised [by U.S. and foreign regulators] and developed significant momentum . . . ."). 112 Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 10-12, 34 (describing the potential negative effects of "the dismemberment of the parent holding company"). company and must refrain from interfering with the SIFI's operating subsidiaries. 114 At present, it is highly doubtful whether cross-border cooperation would be forthcoming if a global SIFI failed. Only a few nations have adopted SIFI resolution laws comparable to Title II of Dodd-Frank. 115 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently concluded that "as yet, orderly resolution of systemic cross-border banks is not a feasible option." 116 The IMF warned, "Should a large cross-border bank fail today, it appears unlikely that the pitfalls and misaligned incentives that undermined [international] cooperation in the global financial crisis could be avoided." 117 Similarly, the FSB recently reported that "most jurisdictions do not currently have statutory powers to recognise, enforce or give legal effect to foreign resolution measures." 118 The FSB also cautioned that "very few jurisdictions currently have [cross-border resolution] frameworks in place," 119 and "no jurisdiction has experience" in applying such a framework to accomplish "the resolution of a complex, cross-border financial group." 120 In the absence of an effective international regime for resolving global SIFIs, host countries would likely use "ring-fencing" tactics to protect their citizens, including segregation and seizure of SIFIowned assets located in their jurisdictions. 121 Thus, SPOE's claimed advantages are doubtful at best and do not justify giving blanket protection to Wall Street creditors of failed SIFIs at the expense of ordinary investors and taxpayers. As discussed in Part III below, policymakers must adopt reforms to mitigate the impact of SPOE's shortcomings if SPOE is chosen as the preferred strategy for resolving failed SIFIs.
III. POLICYMAKERS SHOULD ADOPT TWO REFORMS TO REDUCE THE
TBTF SUBSIDY EMBODIED IN WALL STREET'S SPOE PLAN U.S. and foreign regulators have expressed strong support for SPOE despite its flaws. 122 In addition, regulators have not developed any alternative plan that could liquidate failed SIFIs during a systemic crisis without disrupting financial markets. 123 Nor has Congress acted on legislative proposals that would force megabanks to become smaller and less complex, thereby removing (or reducing) the TBTF threat they pose to the financial sector and financial crisis, "leading in some cases to the breakup of [SIFI] groups into national components"); id. at 25-29 (noting that France, Belgium and the Netherlands could not agree on resolution plans for Dexia and Fortis and ultimately broke up both cross-border SIFIs into separate, nationalized banks); Paul Taylor, European Bank Mergers Still Face Hurdles PostStress Tests, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/12/us-ecb-banks-t ests-insight-idUSKCN0I105920141012 (describing "ring-fencing" strategies used by European bank regulators during the financial crisis and quoting former BoE Governor Mervyn King's observation that "global banks are global in life but national in death"). 122 See supra notes 38-46, 69-71, 108-11 and accompanying text. In November 2015, after the manuscript for this article had been completed, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) issued proposed rules that would require parent holding companies of U.S. G-SIBs and U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign G-SIBs to maintain minimum levels of qualifying TLAC, including Tier 1 equity and long-term, bail-in debt. As I have described elsewhere, the Fed's proposed TLAC rules would (1) entrench SPOE as the chosen strategy for resolving failed G-SIBs and (2) finance such resolutions by wiping out investments made by shareholders and bail-in debtholders of the parent holding companies, with OLF loans as the ultimate backstop. The Fed's proposed TLAC rules would ensure that operating subsidiaries of failed G-SIBs and their creditors would receive full protection, while most or all of the resolution costs would be borne by ordinary investors and taxpayers. See Arthur E. Wilmarth 123 Lubben, supra note 64, at 13-14; Skeel, supra note 64, at 2-3, 9-10. the economy. 124 It therefore appears likely that regulators will adopt SPOE as their preferred approach for resolving failed SIFIs. If SPOE becomes the primary roadmap for OLA resolutions, policymakers must adopt two reforms that would force SIFIs and their insiders to internalize at least some of the costs of the systemic risks they create. First, SIFIs should pay risk-adjusted premiums to prefund the OLF. Those premiums should include fees on uninsured deposits and short-term shadow banking liabilities held by SIFIs. Second, SIFIs should pay at least half of their total compensation to senior executives and other key employees in the form of CoCos.
A. SIFIS SHOULD PAY RISK-ADJUSTED PREMIUMS TO PREFUND OLF
As discussed above, Dodd-Frank established the OLF to provide funding for the FDIC's liquidation of failed SIFIs, but Wall Street blocked legislative proposals that would have compelled SIFIs to pay premiums to prefund the OLF. 126 Consequently, the OLF has a zero balance, and the FDIC will be obliged to impose retroactive assessments on large financial institutions to cover unpaid balances on OLF loans after resolving failed SIFIs. As previously shown, the FDIC would likely forebear from imposing assessments on surviving megabanks during a financial crisis. 127 OLF borrowings would therefore remain unpaid until long after the crisis had passed. 128 Thus, taxpayers will almost certainly be forced to underwrite resolutions of failed SIFIs via long-term OLF loans.
The availability of OLF loans allows SIFIs to obtain short-term funding at artificially low, government-subsidized rates because short-term creditors of SIFIs expect to be fully protected during any future SPOE resolution. A prefunded OLF would shrink this subsidy for SIFIs and their creditors. 129 I have proposed that banking firms with assets exceeding $100 billion, together with nonbank financial companies designated as SIFIs under Dodd-Frank, should pay risk-adjusted premiums to prefund the OLF, over a period of several years, at a minimum level of $300 billion. 130 That level is justified by the fact that Treasury provided $290 billion of capital assistance to the nineteen largest banks and AIG during the recent financial crisis. 131 Each SIFI should pay risk-adjusted OLF premiums that reflect its contribution to systemic risk, based on factors such as size, complexity, opacity, leverage, liquidity, volatility of earnings, and interconnectedness with other large financial institutions. 132 Thus, OLF premiums should require each SIFI to "internalize" the systemic risk costs that it creates. 133 The FDIC should use OLF premiums to cover losses from resolving a SIFI that remain unpaid after the FDIC has written off investments made by shareholders, holders of subordinated debt, and qualifying holders of bail-in bonds. If the FDIC uses OLF premiums to cover such losses, the FDIC should impose additional risk-adjusted premiums on large financial institutions to replenish the OLF. 134 Requiring SIFIs to prefund the OLF would have several highly desirable outcomes. First, a prefunded OLF would help to protect Treasury and taxpayers from bearing the costs of resolving failed SIFIs. Second, a well-designed, risk-adjusted schedule for OLF premiums should encourage SIFIs to reduce their risks by following more prudent business strategies, maintaining stronger capital and liquidity positions, and adopting simpler, less complex business structures. Third, SIFIs would have strong incentives to monitor other megabanks and alert regulators when they observe aggressive risk-taking by their peers. Each SIFI would know that the failure of a peer institution would be likely to trigger additional OLF assessments. 135 Fourth, a prefunded OLF would reduce the funding burden on prudent SIFIs by forcing high-risk megabanks to pay at least some OLF premiums before they fail. 136 Fifth, a prefunded OLF would encourage regulators to resolve failed SIFIs promptly. A prefunded OLF would give the FDIC greater resources to resolve failed SIFIs without exposing taxpayers to the costs of OLF loans. In contrast, the presently unfunded OLF encourages regulators to delay putting troubled SIFIs into OLA receiverships in order to postpone (and hopefully avoid) the unpopular step of using taxpayer-backed OLF loans to finance the resolutions. 137 For all of the above reasons, a supra note 1, at 1021-22 (proposing that the OLF premiums paid by each SIFI should be based on various factors related to systemic risk). 133 SIFIs rely on cheap funding from government-subsidized, shortterm liabilities to finance their speculative activities in the capital markets. 139 During the credit boom leading up to the financial crisis, megabanks expected that governments would protect all of their depositors (insured and uninsured) in order to preserve financial stability.
Regulators fulfilled that expectation by providing bailouts that rescued failing megabanks and protected all of their depositors. 140 SIFIs continue to rely on low-cost deposits to finance their capital markets activities. 141 SIFIs also draw much of their short-term funding from shadow banking liabilities, including commercial paper, securities repurchase agreements (repos), and various types of asset-backed securities. 142 Those instruments function as "shadow bank deposits" because they are "expected to be available on demand 138 See Levitin, supra note 65 ("If there's going to be a guarantee [for short-term liabilities of SIFIs under SPOE], it needs to be explicit and priced."). 139 See Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 331-32 (explaining that WallStreet mounted a successful campaign to repeal the Lincoln Amendment to Dodd-Frank because SIFIs were determined to maintain their ability to conduct high-risk derivatives activities within their subsidiary banks so that they could "keep exploiting the cheap funding" provided by bank deposits). 140 143 Shadow banking liabilities allow megabanks to obtain low-cost funding while avoiding deposit insurance premiums and, in some cases, higher capital requirements. 144 Indeed, repos have provided a cheaper source of funding than bank deposits during the past several years. 145 Investors in shadow banking liabilities include wealthy individuals, hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, corporations, municipalities, and other institutional investors. 146 Many of those investors have close connections to Wall Street megabanks. 147 The financial crisis "demonstrated that shadow banking creates new channels of contagion and systemic risk transmission between traditional banks and the capital markets." 148 For example, about 90% of the assets of "prime" money market mutual funds (MMMFs) consist of short-term liabilities issued by financial institutions, including "commercial paper, structured securities, bank obligations, and repurchase agreements." 149 During the financial crisis, markets for commercial paper and repos froze, and many MMMFs experienced runs by investors. 150 To prevent a collapse of the financial system, federal agencies established a wide array of emergency programs to protect shadow banking creditors, including loans, guarantees, and asset purchases, which collectively provided a "360° backstop" for shadow banking liabilities. 151 For example, Treasury guaranteed MMMF investors against further losses, the FDIC guaranteed new issuances of debt by financial holding companies, and the Federal Reserve System (Fed) purchased commercial paper and made loans to broker-dealers. 152 Those federal programs pledged trillions of dollars to protect short-term creditors of large financial institutions, thereby serving as "modern-day equivalents of deposit insurance" for shadow banking liabilities. 153 HSBC chairman Douglas Flint recently acknowledged that universal banks received an "implicit subsidy" during the financial crisis "[b]ecause investment banking operations were alongside society's deposits, [and] there was an implicit underwriting of all the debt within the operation because one would not risk the systemic panic that would happen if people thought their deposits were at risk . . . ." 154 FDIC Vice Chair Thomas Hoenig has warned that universal banks continue to exploit the federal government's "safety net subsidy" by combining commercial banking with capital markets activities and by relying on "wholesale funding markets" that are "major sources of volatility in times of financial stress." 155 SPOE would perpetuate that subsidy by protecting short-term liabilities issued by SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries.
As part of their OLF premiums, SIFIs should pay fees on their uninsured deposits and other short-term liabilities. Those fees should be comparable to risk-based deposit insurance premiums and should reflect the credit, liquidity, and market risks inherent 151 Pozsar et al., supra note 9, at 59-64. 152 Id. at 61-64; BLINDER, supra note 1, at 144-49, 161- in each SIFI's short-term liabilities. 156 The FDIC should monitor changes in short-term funding strategies used by SIFIs, and the FDIC should impose fees on new types of short-term liabilities that serve as substitutes for deposits, commercial paper, or repos. 157 Requiring SIFIs to pay fees on their short-term liabilities would help to shrink their TBTF subsidy. Those fees would (1) force SIFIs to internalize risks created by those liabilities, (2) encourage SIFIs to adopt more stable, longer-term funding strategies that reduce their reliance on volatile, short-term liabilities, and (3) help to prefund OLF, thereby improving the FDIC's ability to resolve failed SIFIs without relying on taxpayer-backed loans. 158 
B. SIFIS SHOULD PAY AT LEAST HALF OF THEIR COMPENSATION TO SENIOR EXECUTIVES AND OTHER KEY INSIDERS IN THE FORM OF COCOS
Universal Banks Provide Extraordinary Benefits to Insiders at the Expense of Taxpayers and Society.
As shown above, universal banks rely on subsidized, low-cost funding from deposits and shadow banking liabilities to finance their capital markets activities, including underwriting, market making, and trading in securities and derivatives. 159 Most of the largest global banks have adopted the universal banking model as their favored 156 See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 22, at 500-01 (describing the FDIC's riskbased deposit insurance premiums). 157 See Tracy Alloway, Meet the New Shadow Bank (It's a Lot Like the Old Shadow Bank), BLOOMBERG, June 17, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-17/meet-thenew-shadow-bank-it-s-a-lot-like-the-old-shadow-bank-(reporting that financial institutions were creating "a host of new vehicles" in order "to fill the hole left by . . . a shrinking repo market"). 158 See Acharya & Öncü, supra note 146, at 343-44 (discussing proposals to require issuers of repos to pay fees similar to deposit insurance premiums); Adrian & Ashcraft, supra note 147, at 130-32 (describing proposals to require issuers of MMMFs to pay assessments to create an "ex ante buffer" to protect their investors). 159 See supra Part III.A.2. Megabanks receive additional benefits from the preferential treatment given to repos and derivatives under the Bankruptcy Code and statutes governing insolvencies of banks and SIFIs. Large universal banks are the primary beneficiaries of that preferential treatment because they are leading issuers of repos and dominant dealers in derivatives. For discussions of this topic, which is beyond the scope of this Article, see generally CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 22, at 506-07; Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1361-62 and sources cited therein. business strategy. 160 The universal banking model creates a strong likelihood that serious problems occurring in one sector of the financial industry will spill over into other sectors and trigger a systemic crisis, as occurred during [2007] [2008] [2009] . To stop the spread of contagion, governments provided trillions of dollars of assistance to protect depositors and shadow banking creditors of universal banks. 161 In addition to their huge systemic risks, universal banks have performed very poorly during the past decade, even after receiving massive benefits from their TBTF subsidy. 162 As a prominent financial magazine recently stated, "It is hard to avoid the conclusion that global banks are . . . dysfunctional conglomerates." 163 A prominent columnist for a leading financial newspaper similarly declared, "The universal banking model is broken . . . ." 164 Despite the woeful performance of global megabanks, their top executives are determined to preserve the universal banking model. 165 Their attitude is not surprising, since large financial conglomerates have provided immense benefits to senior executives and other key employees (including traders). Compensation in the financial industry rose rapidly between 1980 and 2006, as banks became larger and more complex, and in 2006 financial sector compensation reached its highest level (compared with pay in other industries) since the early 1930s. 166 Top executives of megabanks prospered even as their shareholders received lackluster or negative returns. 167 Meanwhile, taxpayers and society incurred tremendous costs when financial markets froze and governments were forced to bail out SIFIs and their creditors during the financial crisis. 168 Perverse incentives in megabanks' compensation plans help to explain the stark disparity between insiders' extraordinary gains and outsiders' huge losses. SIFIs promised very large rewards to senior executives and other key insiders if they met short-term profit goals. 169 Those rewards encouraged speculative bets that produced short-term earnings and bonuses for insiders but later inflicted gigantic losses on ordinary investors, the deposit insurance fund, taxpayers, and society. 170 Compensation policies that encouraged excessive risk-taking were especially dangerous at megabanks, given their highly-leveraged capital structures and their reliance on explicit and implicit safety net subsidies. 171 Many analysts and regulators agree that executive compensation policies at SIFIs must be reformed to remove incentives for shortterm gambling. 172 
SIFIs Should Pay Much of Their Compensation to Insiders in the Form of CoCos.
To change the incentives for insiders at megabanks, regulators should compel SIFIs to adopt compensation policies that include smaller equity-based incentives and a much larger focus on long-term debt. During the period leading up to the financial crisis, large banks assumed greater risks and suffered bigger losses if their executive compensation plans included strong equity-based incentives. 173 Executives at those institutions made aggressive acquisitions, expanded nontraditional, fee-based businesses (including investment banking), and acquired large amounts of subprime mortgagebacked securities. 174 In contrast, banks that issued larger amounts of long-term debt to their top executives performed significantly better during the financial crisis and had a substantially lower risk of default. 175 Long-term debt compensation for executives (inside debt) includes pension rights and deferred compensation rights, which are "typically unfunded and unsecured" and therefore "face default risk just as outside creditors do." 176 Executives holding a higher proportion of inside debt in relation to their equity interests had incentives that were more aligned with long-term creditors and therefore adopted lower-risk business strategies prior to the financial crisis. 177 The foregoing evidence supports the view that key insiders at SIFIs (including senior executives, traders and risk managers) should receive a large portion of their compensation in the form of long-term debt. I have previously argued that SIFIs should pay at least half of the total compensation for key insiders in the form of CoCos. 178 CoCos for key insiders should be converted into common stock upon the occurrence of a designated event of financial stress, including (1) a decline in capital below a specified level or (2) the initiation of an OLA receivership, a bankruptcy, or another insolvency proceeding for a SIFI or one of its principal operating subsidiaries. The Fed, as the primary supervisor of the SIFI's parent holding company, should have the authority to activate any pre-insolvency trigger for financial distress.
Key insiders of SIFIs should be barred from making any voluntary conversions of their CoCos into common stock until three to five years after their employment ends. In addition, after voluntary conversions occur, insiders should be required to spread their sales of common stock over an additional period of similar length. Insiders should also be prohibited from using derivatives or other instruments to hedge their exposure to CoCos or common stock issuable upon conversion of CoCos.
A lengthy post-employment holding period for CoCos and a further deferral period for sales of common stock issued upon voluntary conversions of CoCos would discourage insiders from making high-risk gambles to boost the value of their equity-based compensation or the voluntary conversion option for their CoCos. Insiders would know that their CoCos would be automatically converted into common stock upon the occurrence of a designated triggering event indicating financial distress. Any common stock 177 See Bennett et al., supra note 171, at 36. 178 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing CoCos). The following description of my proposal to require SIFIs to pay much of their executive compensation in the form of CoCos is adapted from Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1008-09, and Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 365-67.
IV. CONCLUSION
The high-risk business model of universal banks was an important cause of the financial crisis. Universal banks rely on cheap funding from government-subsidized deposits and shadow banking liabilities to finance their speculative activities in the capital markets. By combining deposit-taking and lending with underwriting, market making, and trading in securities and derivatives, the universal banking model creates a strong likelihood that problems occurring in one sector of the financial industry will spread to other sectors. To prevent such contagion, federal regulators have powerful incentives to intervene during any serious disruption to protect universal banks and their depositors and short-term creditors. The support expressed by regulators for Wall Street's SPOE plan is a natural outgrowth of those incentives.
Wall Street's SPOE plan would guarantee future bailouts for Wall Street creditors while imposing losses from resolving failed SIFIs on ordinary investors and taxpayers. Wall Street's SPOE plan would also ensure that a failed SIFI would emerge from OLA with minimal structural changes. Thus, Wall Street's version of SPOE would preserve TBTF treatment for SIFIs and their Wall Street creditors. In a future crisis, ordinary citizens would be expected once again-whether as investors in bail-in bonds or as taxpayers-to rescue Wall Street from its reckless gambling. Wall Street's SPOE plan is part of its broader campaign to defend the universal banking model. That business model has provided extraordinary benefits to insiders of SIFIs at the expense of ordinary investors, taxpayers, and society. A straightforward policy response would be to break up SIFIs by imposing maximum size limits or by requiring functional separation similar to the Glass-Steagall Act. 184 However, Congress has declined to adopt either approach. 185 184 See supra notes 5, 124 (describing proposals to impose maximum size limits on financial institutions and to enact a modern version of the Glass-Steagall Act). 185 See supra note 124 (discussing Congress' failure to adopt either reform). As an alternative remedy, I have proposed "narrow banking" reforms that would reduce Despite SPOE's serious flaws, U.S. and foreign regulators appear likely to adopt SPOE as their preferred strategy for resolving failed SIFIs. If SPOE does become the preferred approach, policymakers should adopt two reforms to reduce SPOE's subsidy for SIFIs and their insiders. First, SIFIs should pay risk-adjusted premiums (including fees on their uninsured deposits and short-term shadow banking liabilities) to prefund the OLF. Second, SIFIs should pay at least half of their total compensation for key insiders in the form of CoCos that are subject to lengthy post-employment holding periods.
The foregoing reforms would not eliminate the TBTF subsidy for megabanks. Those reforms, however, would compel SIFIs and their insiders to internalize at least some of the costs of the systemic risks they impose on society. Requiring SIFIs and their insiders to absorb those costs would encourage them to follow more sustainable, long-term business policies, and would also support current efforts by regulators to persuade SIFIs to reduce their size and complexity. 186 government subsidies for SIFIs and increase market pressures for voluntary breakups by (1) establishing strict legal firewalls between banking and nonbanking subsidiaries of SIFIs, and (2) prohibiting SIFIs from using deposits from their "narrow banks" to finance their nonbanking activities. Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 342-63. 186 See Moore, Onaran & Comfort, supra note 162 (reporting that U.S. and foreign regulators have imposed tougher capital rules, stress tests, liquidity requirements, and resolution planning standards to encourage megabanks to become smaller and less complex).
